Angel One Ltd. makes a corporate announcement

Total cash outflow: approximately Rs117.2 Crores, calculated as:

`Rs13 × approximately 9.02 crore equity shares = Rs117.2 Crores`

Angel One had 90,150,994 shares outstanding after the 26 September 2024 allotment, while the count was 90,179,872 shares after the 30 October allotment; both imply approximately Rs117.2 Crores when rounded. ^{[1] [2]}

Policy alignment: The FY24 Dividend Distribution Policy states that the Board will endeavour to pay quarterly interim dividends and, if prudent, a final dividend, with the aggregate payout targeted at at least 35% of annual PAT, on a standalone or consolidated basis. The policy also gives the Board discretion to modify the payout after considering liquidity, working capital, capital expenditure, borrowings and other factors. ^{[3] [3]}

Using Q2 FY25 year-to-date consolidated PAT of Rs716.09 Crores, this Rs117.2 Crores dividend represents 16.36% of YTD PAT, derived from Rs117.2 Crores divided by Rs716.09 Crores. ^[4]

The correct interpretation is that the October interim dividend was below 35% on a standalone YTD comparison, but that does not by itself indicate non-compliance with the policy. The policy’s 35% reference applies to the aggregate FY25 dividend payout, not necessarily to each interim instalment. Final alignment therefore depends on the total interim and final dividends declared for FY25 relative to full-year FY25 PAT.

The Q2 FY25 call did not disclose a rupee impact per order. Management quantified the expected F&O-circular impact at approximately 13–14% of net income earned from a customer, not specifically of Net Brokerage Revenue per order. ^[5]

Using the presentation’s Net Broking Income proxy:

• Q2 FY25: 1,574 / 489.18 million orders = 3.22 reported chart units per order
• Q1 FY25: 1,522 / 462.18 million orders = 3.29 reported chart units per order
• Derived QoQ change: down 0.08 units per order, or 2.29%

The underlying figures are reported in the presentation, but the extracted Net Broking Income chart does not specify the monetary unit; therefore, this should not be labelled as Rs per order without the original chart’s unit confirmation. ^{[6] [7]}

Applying management’s 13–14% estimate mechanically to the Q2 proxy would imply a potential reduction of roughly 0.42–0.45 chart units per order, but this is only an illustrative translation. It is not a reported per-order impact and assumes that “customer net income” maps directly to Net Broking Income.

Margin comparison

The margin profile was stronger in Q2:

• Q1 FY25 reported EBDAT margin: 37.7%
• Q1 FY25 normalized EBDAT margin: 48.0%, excluding the one-off IPL-related cost
• Q2 FY25 reported EBDAT margin: 49.9%

Thus, Q2 margin was 12.2 percentage points above reported Q1 and 1.9 percentage points above normalized Q1. ^[8]

The key interpretation is that the 2.29% decline in the per-order proxy should not be treated as the full SEBI impact. The 13–14% estimate was forward-looking, while the Q2 results largely pre-date the effective loss of the affected ancillary income; management said that income of 1.1 billion was extinguished from October 1 under the separate true-to-label circular. ^[8] Q2’s margin strength was also helped by the absence of Q1’s IPL-related expense, so the normalized comparison—49.9% versus 48.0%—is the more meaningful benchmark.

Angel One’s non-broking contribution increased materially: on the company’s gross-revenue bridge, non-broking revenue rose from 30.71% of total revenue in Q2 FY24 to 38.28% in Q2 FY25, an increase of 7.58 percentage points. The shift was driven primarily by interest income, while distribution was still small. ^[9]

Angel One revenue mix

† Derived as total gross revenue less gross broking revenue. The residual includes interest income, ancillary transaction income, distribution and other operating services; the company does not provide a fully consistent historical sub-breakdown of every non-broking category.

The key point is that Angel One became less dependent on pure broking revenue, with broking’s share falling from roughly 69% to 62%. Interest income was the main contributor to the diversification: its share increased by about 7 percentage points, supported by the larger client-funding book. Distribution income was only around 1.70% of Q2 FY25 revenue when calculated from the reported Rs 25.7 Cr, so it was strategically relevant but not yet a major revenue pool. ^{[11] [8]}

Comparison with listed broking and financial-services peers

Analytical read: Angel One’s 38.3% non-broking share places it close to Anand Rathi’s Q2 FY25 proxy and ahead of Share India’s FY24 annual non-broking proxy, although the definitions and periods are not perfectly aligned. It remains much more transaction-led than 360 ONE, Nuvama or IIFL, whose revenue pools are built around wealth management, asset management, capital markets, distribution and lending rather than primarily retail trading.

Thus, Angel One’s diversification was real and visibly improving in Q2 FY25, but it was still principally an interest-income-led extension of the broking platform; distribution and other services had not yet become large enough to make the model resemble a full-service wealth manager.